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A VITAL QUESTION

MUST CANADA of the
FUTURE HAVE
a NAVY ?

—BY—

T. W. SHEFFIELD, A.M. INS. M.E.

REPRODUCED FROM

THE HAMILTON SPECTATOR
THE NEWS,
THE MAIL AND EMPIRE,
THE TORONTO WORLD,
CANADIAN FIELD,
AND OTHER LEADING CANADIAN NEWSPAPERS.

WITH EXTRACTS FROM THE GLOBE
AND CRITICISMS.

REPRODUCED TO FURTHER THE CAUSE
OF A CANADIAN BRANCH OF THE
NAVY LEAGUE

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H. M. S. DREADNOUGHT.

First of the Dreadnought class, the latest type of which embodies many striking changes in naval battleship construction, costing over \$10,000,000, of which it is estimated by naval experts Great Britain will be required to construct eight to keep peace with the naval program recently laid down by Germany.

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Introduction

ENCOURAGED by the Press of both parties, and letters received from members of the Government in support of the article upon the subject published in the Hamilton Spectator, The News, Mail and Empire, The World, Canadian Field, and leading newspapers, I have reproduced some of the leaders from the Canadian press which have so materially assisted in solving this vital question, which is of paramount importance to the Dominion.

In this connection the Hamilton Spectator has persistently pursued its wise policy in endeavoring to enlighten public opinion on this national question long ere many of its contemporaries took up the subject. This, combined with the stirring lectures of Judge Barron before the Canadian Clubs throughout the country has played no small part in awakening public interest in the matter, with the great advantage of eliminating party issues. The remarks concerning Admiral Lord Charles Beresford were written from personal remembrance during the writer's early connection with Government Dock Yards, and it is gratifying to see that the opinions expressed on the Admiral's general policy were amply borne out by his public utterances at the recent opening of the National Exhibition at Toronto.

The gravity of the best issue to this question renders it imperative that party politics should be buried, and the best brains of all classes in the country should think strongly and fearlessly with cool deliberation, not only provincially, but the whole empire; thinking of the future as well as the present, with thoughts well weighed; to attempt honestly to assure every thinking Canadian between the Atlantic and the Pacific that our national dignity and safety is assured and that the bonds of deep sympathy and naval interests existing between Canada, Great Britain and her sister nations beyond the seas are guarded by our honesty, dignity and assurance for a powerful navy, thereby ensuring freedom, justice and power to look after our own and others when in distress or peril of a navy more powerful than their own.

T. W. SHEFFIELD, Hamilton.

Oct 12

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CANADIAN NAVY DEFENSE: AN EMPIRE'S NAVY

BY T. W. SHEFFIELD.

When Great Britain's supremacy of the seas is challenged by the domineering ambition of any naval power, the national existence of Canada becomes imperiled.

This expression is not given in any party or jingo spirit, but from careful observations of the situation in Germany, France, South Africa and Canada. A great deal has been written upon the subject, mostly by those who have had very little opportunity of getting in touch with naval matters, either from a practical or an administrative point of view. It is therefore reasonable to expect a few observations on the recent crisis by one who has been trained in what may be termed the cradle of the navy, and will not be without interest at the present time. Many important side issues will of necessity have to be omitted to bring out the more serious views of the unquestionable and urgent needs of "An Empire's Navy."

Hitherto it has always been referred to as the British navy, but recent events call for a broader interpretation of its true and real significance, and what more fitting title could fill the roll than "The Empire's Navy?" The continued and prolonged apathy of Canada on this question is appalling. How is it? The reasons are not difficult of solution.

Firstly—The overestimated security of the present and past governments in the British navy.

Secondly—The inborn sense of security of the people living so far from the actual centers of naval powers.

Thirdly—The assumed immunity from war.

Fourthly—Lack of opportunity in seeing the grey sentinels guarding the empire's highways of commerce.

"The Sand in the Hour Glass is Running Low."

It is not altogether strange that Canada fails to appreciate Great Britain's attitude in suddenly finding out that her navy must at all costs be strengthened to the full two-power

standard. No exception has ever been taken to a foreign power providing a navy strong enough to guard her own possessions, but when that power undertakes a secret policy of battleship construction there can only be one object in view, and that is aggression, which is the true and only solution of Germany's rapid progress during the last seven years, even against the outcry of its already overburdened taxpayer. Seven years ago the writer was in Germany during the campaign for the German navy league (which is similar in purpose to the British Navy League, having a duly organized branch in Toronto). When a certain section of the Reichstag condemned the policy of naval expenditure, the patriotic fever for a larger navy with the Emperor of Germany as chief patron to the society, overruled all economical considerations and surpassed anything ever witnessed in Great Britain, and to-day the German Navy League, emulating Britain's example, has far surpassed the home society in political importance. The true significance of Germany acquiring the Island of Heligoland, in the German ocean, has yet to be learned. It was ceded to Germany in 1890, after being in Great Britain's possession for over a century. It has been fortified with the most modern guns by Krupps to protect the entrance to the Elbe and for other strategic reasons. When it belonged to Great Britain it was a calling place for fresh water only.

Germany's Rapid Progress.

In 1895 the German fleet consisted of five inferior battleships, with a small fleet of very inferior torpedo boats. To-day the German navy consists of twenty-one first-class line of battleships of the semi-Dreadnought type, and she is building Dreadnoughts at practically the same rate and standard as Great Britain, which is the outcome of the German naval bill of 1900, providing for an elaborate building program extending until 1917, by which date she will have forty battleships and an overwhelming proportion of armored cruisers

and other vessels. At the time of writing Great Britain has thirty first-class battleships in the semi-Dreadnought type. In this connection it is important to note that Germany's interest in what was thought to be Great Britain's own secret was revealed in

press and leading engineering papers of the country.

Technical Explanation.

The term Dreadnought is too widely applied to-day and a little explanation is necessary to convey what this title



H. M. S. MAJESTIC.

British type of Battleship built previous to the Dreadnought class, only firing the big guns fore and aft from fixed turrets—the turrets on the Dreadnought type are constructed to fire broadside on.

the fact that the figures taken on the trials of the first Dreadnought were published in Germany before they became known to the taxpayers of Great Britain, a situation calling for strong comment at the time by the

implies to gauge the relative strengths of each navy. The standard type of battleship, before the advent of the Dreadnought class was the Royal Oak, Mars, and Glory type, ranging from 12,000 to 14 300 tons displace-

ment, armed with four 12-inch guns, guns being mounted in turrets fore and aft, each containing two guns, and twelve to sixteen quick-firing guns, of 6-inch caliber. The 12-inch firing a shell weighing 850 pounds, three shots a minute, at an effective range of four miles. The six-inch guns fire a shell weighing 100 pounds, discharging eight to ten a minute at an effective range of two and a half to three miles. The speed of these ships range from sixteen to nineteen knots an hour. The three ships of this class the writer was connected with, were built in from two to two and a half years before going into commission, costing over \$4,000,000. The type following on these were the Majestic type, costing over \$5,000,000, being 400 feet long with a beam of 75 feet, having a speed of over 18 knots, carrying four 12-inch guns in turrets.

The Dreadnought type is called after the first bearing that name, being some 17,000 tons displacement. The latest type being over 20,000 tons displacement, being armed with ten 12-inch guns, mounted in five turrets, so arranged that eight guns can be brought to bear on either side broadside. They are also equipped with a number of torpedo tubes and quick-firing machine guns for resisting the attack of torpedo boat destroyers. They are faster than the semi-Dreadnought or Glory class, having a speed of about 22 knots an hour, at which speed they could keep at long range, manoeuvring at a distance of four to five miles from an enemy of say, the Glory class, at which range they could inflict terrible damage, having eight big guns to the former class's four. The total cost is considerably over \$10,000,000 before being ready for commission. They have a crew of over 400 on board, which will give some idea of the enormous amount required for their maintenance. It would take quite a volume in itself to describe the building and equipment of one of these units of empire.

A Comparison.

The latest type of German Dreadnought is similar in all respects to the foregoing type alluded to. Nine years ago it was a stupendous undertaking for Germany to build even one ship of the Dreadnought class. To-day capitalists and employers of labor are devoting all their time resources and money to the great task they have in hand, the outcome of which, as the present program now stands, the German navy will have an established

fleet of forty battleships (Dreadnoughts), twenty-five cruiser battleships of the Glory class, forty protected cruisers, 150 destroyers, fifty submarine and a small fleet of aerial warships and captive balloons attached to the fleet, which will be the best equipped in the world—a fleet that will be brought forcibly before the government when Lord Charles Beresford brings his just and practical criticisms on this and other matters requiring urgent reform in the British navy. The extension program has only been possible through the combined efforts of the great firm of Krupp & Essen, employing over 30,000 hands, associated with the numerous establishments located in three or four parts of Germany. In co-operation with Krupps, there is the larger ship building yard of Blohm & Voss, at Hamburg, who recently launched the first German cruiser battleship built by them, of which they have several in hand. Then there is the great Vulkan yard at Stettin, and several ship building yards of similar capacity, all of which compare favorably with the British firms of such world-wide repute as Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., Vickers Sons & Maxim, John Brown, Cammell, Laird & Co., Palmers, the Thames Shipbuilding Co., and Beardmore & Co., the combined firms employing over 90,000 hands. All these firms are capable of building the latest type of Dreadnoughts, either for the British navy, Japan, Spain, Russia or Brazil, some of the most formidable of these country's battleships having been built by the firms alluded to. This comparison is made from authentic information recently forwarded from Germany by a friend of the writer's, well informed in shipping circles, which points out conclusively the rapid march of progress being made in the German navy. No records of the British navy have a similar parallel. The reason must be obvious to the most apathetic on naval matters, either in Great Britain or Canada. The seamanship and marksmanship of the German navy is quite equal to the British navy. Indeed, at one time it is beyond contradiction, the accurate firing of their large guns was superior to the British until Sir Percy Scott, of Ladysmith fame, took this in hand, with the result that to-day the constant target practice under actual war conditions, has given great Britain the finest trained marksmen in the world, although it will not be long ere Admiral Von Terpitz, the first lord of the German navy, follows closely in

the waks of the "home navy." In this as in all other things naval, Germany follows the lead of the British navy to the minutest detail, which even a casual inspection of their men of war vividly reveals.

The French Navy.

In view of the foregoing comparison a few observations on the French navy may not be out of place. France has justly been proud of her navy, and it has ever been looked upon with envy by Great Britain and Germany, but recent disclosures, combined with the inefficiency and poor discipline, has brought her navy to the level of a second-rate power, which has given Germany a further stimulant to in-

ture; but this was only a forecast of what was in store for an observing eye of one who had seen the exacting efficiency to detail of what may justly be termed the finest naval power in the world. The boats were in a filthy and unsanitary condition from stem to stern. The very brasswork and costly mountings were covered with a thick coating of verdigris. The engine rooms would not even compare favorably with those of a second-rate ocean-going tramp or cattle boat. In making the acquaintance of a smart sea-going engineer, he informed the writer this was nothing unusual. The only time they really cleaned up was during reviews, which expression was verified by the fact that the boats left



H. M. S. VALOR.

Old type British War Ship, equipped with steam and sail in the early period of Queen Victoria's reign—many other classes of battleship followed this before the evolution of the Mars and Glory type, which preceded the Majestic type.

crease her lead in naval armaments. The discipline in the French navy is deplorable, as the following instances will portray. It was on the occasion of the writer's visit to Dieppe at the time of the manoeuvres of the French fleet in 1908, during the evolutions of the torpedo boat squadron. A gale forced them into the harbor of Dieppe coming into the inner basin on Friday. Judging from the battered and white appearance they had evidently been in the face of the gale, for their numbers could not be distinguished. They lined up abreast of each other, without even putting the usual fenders between each other, a somewhat unusual procedure in ordinary good seamanship, especially for craft of this light na-

Dieppe on the Monday in exactly the same condition as they came in. One can make reasonable excuse for this class of craft, as they catch the least sea, but not so with the larger craft, which are very little better and would compare very unfavorably with the Chilian or Argentine cruisers of today.

South Africa.

It was during the stormy outlook of affairs in South Africa in 1886 and 1887 when there were rumors of war in the air, and British troops were being drafted to Ladysmith, at which time it was reported part of the British China squadron was visiting south Africa. There were many reports given out

that the fleet was expected off Durban by a certain date, but they all proved to be without foundation. After days and days of expectation, news was flashed over the wires that the fleet was proceeding up the coast from Port Elizabeth, when the citizens of Durban gathered in thousands on the bold headland, the bluff, to catch a first glimpse of these guardians of peace. What a feeling of security the sight of those five cruisers, flying the royal ensign, gave! The whole crowd felt it. It is something difficult to explain, but we knew it. We could see it. It was palpable to the least patriotic. It is this feeling which, when one has experienced it, it remains and makes one wonder how intensified it would become in the hour of real danger for those who could not defend themselves against the enemy of their country.

Canada.

The lost opportunity for bringing this national feeling to every Canadian visiting the Tercentenary held at Quebec in 1908 has its reflections in the expressions of some of the members of the house at Ottawa. They have no conception of the educational value of seeing a full line of battle-ships in review, although some impressions must still linger with those the writer met at the great review held at Spithead during the conference of the over-sea dominions in 1907. It is impressions of reviews of this order that should have brought the house to its feet in one voice to support the cause so nobly championed by Australia and New Zealand.

Some Reasons for Immediate Action.

The Ottawa Journal voiced the expressions of all loyal Canadians and British subjects throughout these vast dominions when it stated in a recent issue: "We wonder what that phrase, 'the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service will amount to?' This is the question that comes to every one when reviewing the past and present apathetic spirit of the government. It is the most laudable and noble ambition to aspire to creating a fleet, but what nonsense to hoodwink their supporters in the belief that Canada can in a few years build a fleet under her own direction for the protection of its thousands of miles of coast line. It has taken Great Britain over two hundred years, with countless lives and hundreds of millions of dollars, to make her flag respected throughout the oceans of the world, and this with the sea-born spirit bred of generations. Notwith-

standing this, these representatives of the people have the audacity to make brief reference to the vital need of reform. What does it avail that our yet untold mineral wealth of the vast territories is undeveloped, and the granary of the world is in our lap, if we cannot say, "What we have is ours, and what we have we'll hold?" The only way to support such a national assertion is to make our shores invulnerable, and to do this we must make sure that the fleets which surround the British Isles are the undisputed masters for all time of the ocean. The moment that becomes questionable, or there is the slightest risk of even being dictated to by any ambitious naval power, Canada immediately loses her prestige, credit and freedom and yearly disbursements of \$200,000 000, with the outlet for her grain market cut off. The vessels as at present proposed to be built and maintained by Canada could offer but feeble resistance against the cruisers of a fleet or fleets that gained the advantage even if it was only a temporary one. Take, for instance, the recent critical situation caused by the outcry of Canada against the Japanese entering Vancouver, and think for one moment what a few Japanese battleships could have done off the Pacific coast if it had not been for that master stroke of Great Britain in making a naval alliance with Japan. The inference is obvious. They could have demanded their own terms of entry, failing that, they could have shattered the city and destroyed the shipping long ere a British fleet had left the Atlantic for Pacific waters. If the home fleet was even strong enough for such an emergency, which it will not be for several years under the present conditions, and although timely assistance may be rendered by a southern state, what would have been the price, to say nothing of the humiliation? With such highly probable situations occurring Canada should wake up to her real position and duty for her future prosperity.

The moral support of the two Dreadnoughts from Canada maintained by Great Britain in the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans under the Canadian government, would be more dignified, stronger and more influential in showing the world in the present rivalry of naval supremacy, that she was determined at all costs to assist and do her legitimate share in protecting her own, and so materially lighten the burden of the already over-burdened British tax-payer, who have given their all to protect their over-sea sis-

ters, which will readily be appreciated from the following rate of taxes paid in the large cities of Great Britain. In Manchester, the engineering firms, manufacturers, storekeepers and householders have to pay considerably over twenty cents on the dollar of the ratable income assessment and over three cents on the dollar for income tax on a salary amounting to anything over \$750 per annum; in other words, Great Britain's tax-payers pay over \$4 per head annually for the defences afforded Canada. The total amount of which comes to over \$135,000,000, every cent of which is raised by the already over-burdened tax-payers of Great Britain, which is done in a true spirit of loyalty for those of the over-sea dominions. Not one cent of this enormous peace bill is paid for by Canada. No true-born Canadian likes this reflection on his loyalty, and when more eminent authorities bring to light figures and costs for the protection afforded a true sense of responsibility and gratitude will prevail throughout the whole of the Dominion, regardless of party or politics. The figures quoted forcibly point out that any material and real contribution to assist the two-power standard at the present time would be of real service and ultimately lessen the strain of our resources in years to come.

Two ships of the Dreadnought class would cost \$20,000,000 a reasonable sum of insurance for the protection of our inheritance and freedom of a mighty nation. It is estimated a naval engagement between any two first-class powers would cost over \$30,000,000 a day. Stupendous as these figures are they are not unreasonable when we consider the total loss of two Dreadnoughts and one or two cruisers would cost considerably more than this. In other words to guard our own interests proportionately, we have to spend \$20,000,000 for five years to build up a fleet of ten Dreadnoughts to maintain our safety and assist in protecting one of the richest countries in the world, which can obtain on her own solid securities a sum over \$200,000,000 a year from Great Britain whose protecting arms have so long maintained her highways of commerce open to the world. Does Canada appreciate this as fully as she should, and is she taking every reasonable precaution of protecting these mortgages on her national resources, industry and progress in the light of present events? There is but one answer No. There are occasional spasmodic outbursts of real loyalty to

Great Britain, but Canada as a rich, yes, very rich, daughter, should display true filial respect, inborn by real love, by contributing two Dreadnoughts for the continued supremacy of the Empire's Navy. The gift should not be regarded as a debt that must be paid under fear of interest accruing, and thus make the burden too heavy, but should be given to maintain her own dignified position in the family, and as an act of sincere gratitude for the benefits given and accruing to this and future generations.

With the foregoing facts and figures on the lips of public speakers on platform and in pulpit, with newspapers supporting the sentiment of the great public, it becomes necessary for Canadians to admit candidly the situation is serious and therefore open their eyes that they may see and truly understand the writing on the wall. The object lesson taught by Japan should come as a timely warning at the present time. It was thought by many eminent naval authorities that the overwhelming balance of power of the Russian navy would outweigh the superior seamanship of the Japanese navy. It was, no doubt even thought so by the Japanese themselves, which made them undertake at any cost and risk the blowing up by torpedo attack the Russian ships lying in Port Arthur, governing their future tactics on the moral prestige assured by getting in the first decisive blow, immediately on assuming hostilities or practically before war had been declared. History repeats the lesson in more than one instance. Following these observations one quickly awakens to a sense of duty when it is considered what terrible damage could be dealt to Canada if two or three battleships of very moderate size were to suddenly appear in the St. Lawrence. Quebec and Montreal could be razed to the ground within 24 hours, or they could claim an indemnity that would stagger humanity, as the guns in the fortifications down the St. Lawrence are mere pop-guns compared with the modern guns of the leading navies of to-day.

Put Our House in Order.

From this it will readily be understood quite apart from the actual requirements of the next five years alluded to, it is high time a rapid commencement was made to establish government ship-building yards for the construction of torpedo boats and torpedo cruisers with Canadian capital, under the ablest brains and services

Great Britain and Canada can furnish. In this way we should furnish an outlet for young Canada and future generations would no doubt produce ship designers, seamen and admirals worthy of the doughty foe, be he yellow or white. In conjunction with the government yards naval colleges would have to be established similar to the institutions in Great Britain. Training depots could be opened in the large ports of the sea-bound coasts and lakes of Canada. Whilst these are under way, a marine reserve could be mobilised which could be trained for submarine work in the defense of the channels leading to the St. Lawrence. The training could be undertaken in ships provided by the British government. They could also act as guard ships on the coast of Vancouver and Quebec. There are many side issues to such a scheme, but all within the scope of ordinary administrative organization of those connected with naval matters.

The Empire's Navy.

When Canada falls into line with Australia, New Zealand and South Africa she will materially assist in creating what should be termed the "Empire navy." We feel certain, in view of existing facts, she is anxious to cast off the cloak of apathy and bear her share of the burden of naval protection in supplying ships built in Great Britain and when equipped, to have a leading part in the control and disposition of the forces in the Atlantic and Pacific, which, in the first instance, would have to be maintained by Great Britain as there is not the necessary material to even man a torpedo boat of the sea-going type at present. Australia is beginning to build her navy and has placed additional orders for torpedo boats with eminent firms on the Clyde, which marks a new era in Imperial relations with the navy. In South Africa the obligation was realized long before the Boer war. It is the general opinion of its leading government authorities, public bodies and citizens, even by those not in touch with the blue waters of the Indian ocean, that it is their duty to take part in the general as well as the local defence of the empire. The naval brigade at Durban is a striking illustration of what public sentiment will do when well directed and to those who have seen the trained men at Durban going through their drills on the Bluff, it is an object lesson not soon to be forgotten. The recent awakening of her responsibilities to the maintenance of

the two power standard by Great Britain suddenly revealed the fact that this policy has not been maintained, and that by 1912 the German navy would equal, if not excel, that of Great Britain. In a moment on the floor of the house of commons the basis of imperial security disappeared. The defence in which we all trusted was found to be weakened. Our naval supremacy, which all parties maintain, is the only safety of the country and protection of the empire's commerce on the ocean highways, stands threatened, which situation calls for the rallying of every person wishing to strengthen the home navy and protect our own beyond doubt; and although there are naturally widely different views expressed on the subject, we must hope the unbelievers will see the folly of their ways, in spite of all discouraging signs to the contrary, still hope there is enough real patriotism and public spirit left among our leading politicians to rise above the sordid limitations of party politics, rising supreme to the occasion in co-operating in laying the foundation of a true imperial organization, united in joint responsibility for imperial defence and establishment of a common council having joint and equal control of the imperial naval forces for the protection of all our over-sea nations.

T. W. SHEFFIELD.

Hamilton, April 24, 1909

(Extract from Hamilton Spectator.)

A FEW EXTRACTS FROM OVER ONE HUNDRED LETTERS RECEIVED.

Upper Canada College,
Toronto, May 11th, 1909.

Dear Sir,—I beg to acknowledge with thanks your note of May 3rd and your article on the "Naval Position." I have read it with much interest, and I take it as another indication of the widespread hold that the naval question is taking on the country as a matter of first importance.

Believe me, yours truly,

HENRY W. AUDEN.

T. W. Sheffield, Esq.,
Oakville, Ont.

Judge's Chambers,
Stratford, June 18th, 1909.

Dear Mr. Sheffield,—I have yours of 15th inst., with enclosure; the latter I had already read, it having been sent me by a friend in Hamilton. It is good—very good. I wish "the many" could read it.

I'll tell you how you can succeed in working up interest. Form a "Navy League," let it be "Hamilton Branch Canadian League." Membership 25c. Each one wears a button. Lord Grey recently told me that in Germany they have a membership of 1,000,000 men, all of whom wear a button. He wants us to do the like.

Can't you do it in Hamilton?

Yours faithfully,
JOHN A. BARRON.

Brantford, June 5th, 1909.
To the Editor "Spectator,"
Hamilton, Ont.,

Dear Sir,—Your paper of 5th May contained a very patriotic and instructive article on "An Imperial Navy" by Mr. T. W. Sheffield.

I should like very much to draw his attention to the suggestion of the enclosed letter. I believe it is new, practicable, and would constitute, if consummated, a first step towards the Federation of the Empire.

If he is not one of your editorial staff, will you be so good as to forward it to him and much oblige.

Faithfully yours,
W. G. RAYMOND.

Kincardine, May 26th, 1909.
T. W. Sheffield, Esq.,
Oakville.

Dear Sir,—I read with much interest the newspaper article you sent me on May 3rd. It contains valuable information, and no Briton can resist your conclusions.

Yours truly,
HUGH CLARK.

House of Commons,
Ottawa, May 10th, 1909.
T. W. Sheffield, Esq.,
Oakville, Ont.

Dear Mr. Sheffield,—Let me thank you most sincerely for the article which you sent me recently. It certainly is very practical.

Again accept my thanks.
Faithfully,
SAM. HUGHES.

The Navy League,
11, Victoria Street,
London, S. W.
5th July, 1909.

Dear Sir,—I am informed by His Honour Judge Barron that you are disposed to assist the Navy League in its work in Canada, and I trust that I am correct in my information.

It is a somewhat difficult matter for anyone residing on this side of the water to understand the problems

which confront the King's subjects in Canada, but I think I am on safe ground when I suggest that all British subjects are united in their determination to maintain that command of the sea, which is indispensable for the development of the British Empire.

We are most anxious to see the Navy League launched in Canada by Canadians, in order that they may carry out what they believe to be their best national policy, but by way of crystallising public opinion, it is almost a necessity that a society such as the Navy League should be in existence, to diffuse information upon the subject of the navy, for we may safely, I think, consider, that the average citizen, especially in inland cities, knows little or nothing about it.

Judge Barron leads me to believe that you might be disposed to assist in forming a branch of the League in Hamilton, and I therefore enclose you the forms which relate to the formation of branches of the Navy League oversea.

I am, dear sir,
Yours faithfully,
W. C. CRUTCHLEY.
Secretary.

T. W. Sheffield, Esq., Hon. Secretary,
Royal Life Saving Society, Centre,
Hamilton, Ont.

Extract from the Navy League:—
**WHY A SUPREME FLEET IS VITAL
TO YOU.**

By H. T. C. K.

1. Because it is your only guarantee of peace.
2. Because in case Britain is attacked, it is your one hope of victory.
3. Because it ensures the safety of your hearth and home.
4. Because it is intended for defence not defiance.
5. Because you and 43,000,000 other Britons live in an unvitualled ocean citadel in the North Sea.
6. Because it guarantees the safe arrival of your food supply and raw materials from over the sea.
7. Because for you a Fleet is a necessity, to foreign nations it is a luxury.
8. Because the value of your seaborne trade is £1,400,000,000 per annum.
9. Because £200,000,000 worth of food is imported annually into the British Isles (£400 worth per minute).
10. Because you require 300 merchant ships every week to provide you with food and raw materials in the British Isles.

11. Because you possess a mercantile marine of 12,000,000 tons, which would require protection in time of war.

12. Because, if the supply of material and the export of manufactured products is arrested, the wage fund will disappear; so that the purchasing power of the people must prove utterly inadequate to their needs, and the available store of provisions, however increased, will be entirely beyond their means.

13. Because the sea is your highway from any one part of the Empire to any other part.

14. Because you have an Empire of 12,000,000 square miles to protect.

15. Because the population of the Empire is 400,000,000.

16. Because without it you could not transport your troops over-sea to India, or wherever they might be required in time of war.

17. Because in the settlement of international disputes, it is the right arm of the Foreign Minister.

18. Because it helps, as Captain Mahan, U. S. N., says, to guarantee the peace of the world.

19. Because the foundations of the Empire are laid upon sea power.

20. Because you are a trustee for a world-wide Empire which was won for you by your forefathers, and which it is your duty to hand down unimpaired to those who follow you.

21. Because defeat at sea would mean the loss of your Empire and your liberties as a free people.

22. Because it means for you the fact that you are free from invasion.

23. Because your past has lain on the water, your present lies on the water, and your future must lie on the water.

24. Because the fleet of England is her all in all, "her fleet is in your hands, and in her fleet her fate."

God Save the King.

The following are notable sentences in the speeches of the principal speakers in the debate in the House of Commons on March 16, 1909:

Mr. McKenna—

The estimates amount to \$175,712, 100, an increase of \$140,960.00 over the estimates for the current year; but, no matter what the cost, the safety of the country must be assured.

The difficulty in which the Government finds itself placed at this moment is that we do not know, as we thought we did, the rate at which German construction is taking place.

The advent of the Dreadnought type has curtailed the profitable life

of our previously existing battle fleet.

The maintenance of our superiority will depend upon our relative strength in Dreadnoughts alone.

Mr. Balfour—

While the British Government was nursing vain expectations about the Hague Conference, Germany was laying down ships.

The circumstances are absolutely novel and alarming. The Government must not delay to restore even the one-Power standard in ships of the first class.

Any Government which sacrifices national safety to any question of expediency would be worthy of severe condemnation. The Government has raised the question of a mutual agreement upon naval expenditure, but Germany had assured them that her naval programme was governed solely with reference to German needs and did not depend upon ours. Let it be clearly understood, first, that this country was not setting the pace in a race of ship-building with the countries of the world—on the contrary, they were most anxious to slacken—and secondly, that they were not animated by any unfriendly intentions, direct or indirect, to the friendly nation of Germany. He admitted that we did not now enjoy the superiority in ship construction that we thought we held. That was a vital and most serious fact. The Government were anxious to save money for social reform instead of having this vast, horribly devastating and sterilizing expenditure, but it was a supreme paramount necessity of national security.

Extract from Navy League, July, 1909—

GERMAN NAVAL NOTES.

(By H.C.B., Our Own Correspondent.)

Berlin, June 20.

The Flottenverein at Keil.

It is a singularly encouraging sign of the times that such comprehensive reports of the German Navy League's annual general meeting at Keil this month should have been telegraphed to certain London journals. That fact indicates a growing appreciation of the significance which attaches to those conferences of an organization, which, however pointedly Prince Henry of Prussia and other high personages may describe it as "absolutely independent," is actually an appanage of the Imperial Government. The Flottenverein was conceived, born, and reared in an atmosphere of official in-

spiration, which, far from having been dissipated, becomes more obvious year by year. While, therefore, it may not be strictly correct to interpret the utterances of its spokesmen as the voice of the Wilhelmstrasse, there is not the least doubt that they echo more or less accurately the keynote sounded from that historic thoroughfare. The speech of Rear-Admiral Weber gives warning to all whom it may concern that the ambitious Navy Bill, which became law in 1908, by no means represents the high-water mark of German chauvinist aspirations. Indeed, there were few people possessing an insight into the character of the "blue-water" fever that had seized this nation who did not prophesy a greatly supplemented programme for 1912, at which date, as all Navy Leaguers know, under the 1908 Navy Law the building programme drops from three battleships and one armed cruiser. By that date it is quite on the cards that Germany will have gained a slight lead in the mightiest type of fighting ship, and her rulers would be more than human if they allowed this margin to slip past instead of increasing it. To predict the addition of at least six cruiser-battleships to the building programme of 1912 (or earlier) is merely to make the most manifest deduction from data available. Signs are not wanting that the national Press has been brought into line by the peculiar methods prevailing over here, and inspired naval paragraphs and articles are beginning to appear with ominous frequency. Journals which a few months ago were raising timid protests against further expenditure on schemes of national aggrandisement are now boldly subscribing to the tentative proposals of the Flottenverein. Some months back I mentioned in these notes the heated attack made by the Berliner Tageblatt on the naval administration in general. To-day that same Radical journal is apparently casting its vote for the six additional armoured cruisers demanded by the Flottenverein. All this indicates pressure from high quarters, and, incidentally, is a death-blow to the myth that even certain German newspapers are independent and unsusceptible to official inspiration.

Extract from The News, Toronto, Wednesday, July 21, 1909.

The Two-Power Standard.

British newspapers, when dealing with problems of Imperial defence, contain many references to the "Two-

Power Standard," a subject upon which there has been little discussion in Canada. The considerations upon which this rests, however, are of importance to an understanding of the problem of Imperial defence. The two-power standard is generally accepted as meaning that Great Britain should possess a force of battleships able to cope with the combined battle fleets of the two next strongest powers. The best opinion seems to be that the British battle fleet should have 10 per cent. more ships than the combined fleets of the other two powers.

An immense amount of discussion exists as to what countries should be regarded in making the calculation; many writers, for example, refuse to regard the United States as even a possible enemy, and leave its powerful fleet altogether out of consideration. It is also a moot point whether the Japanese fleet, at present allied to that of Britain, should be included. The phrase sprang up at a time when the fleets of France and Russia were regarded as the probable foe which the British Navy would be called upon to meet. At present the sudden development of the German Navy has made it a question whether in a few years the British Navy will have the desired superiority over that one fleet; so that less is heard of the two-power standard.

Some writers in Great Britain are disposed to satirize those who insist upon the maintenance of the two-power standard as departing from the ancient courage of the British race. One controversialist, for example, has drawn a picture of Drake looking from Plymouth Hoe at the Spanish Armada, shaking his head, and saying broad Devon. "Us baint two to one; us can't do it." And the other day a Canadian, engaged in discussion of the same point asked: "What did Nelson or Drake want with two-power navies?"

Let it be remembered in the first place that the British Empire having staked its whole existence upon the command of the sea, the problem before the Royal Navy is not to win an ultimate victory after a long campaign and much hard fighting, but to win an instant victory, to shut any enemy's fleet up at once within its ports and to allow British trade to go on as quietly as in peace time. The British Navy's frontier is the enemy's coastline. Consequently it must be on the alert against a sudden increase of an enemy's strength by means of an alliance. Very many of the Brit-

ish naval wars have been waged against two or more powers. It may be permissible to regard the Armada as a two-power navy, for it included an Italian squadron. Many of the eighteenth century wars were against France and Spain in combination; in the war of the American Revolution, Britain had to fight three powers, France, Spain and Holland, and in the Napoleonic struggle she had allied against her the navies of all Europe and the United States.

Again, a very possible operation in a naval war in which Great Britain is concerned is a blockade of the enemy's coast. The enemy's ships will lie safe in harbor while the British fleet has to cruise outside waiting for the moment when they choose to come forth. A fleet employed on such a duty is liable to constant deductions from its strength. Ships will need to coal at frequent and regular intervals. Their engines will develop defects from time to time. Damage will be done by storms, repairs will be necessary; and all these contingencies will mean the departure of ship after ship from the fleet to some base of supplies. For a good many years the standard opinion in the Navy has been that for a blockade a proportion of five to three is necessary; that is, that if the enemy has three ships in port, in order always to have three ships outside a total force of five is necessary. Thus in fighting one power a heavy superiority in the total number of ships would be needed to make sure of having a bare equality of force on the actual day of battle. Lying in port, the enemy can make sure of bringing his whole force to bear on the scene of conflict, while the British Navy must expect some deductions from its full strength.

French Naval Re-Construction.

(Toronto World, July 14, 1909.)

France is about to undertake an extensive program of fleet reconstruction and it will embody a number of administrative and disciplinary reforms which are expected to result in a corresponding increase of efficiency. For many years after the close of the Napoleonic wars, indeed down to the rise of the United States and German fleets, France held second place in naval strength, a position to which she was fully entitled on account of the extent and character of her foreign possessions. But although as far back as 1879, a law establishing the definite constitution of the French fleet had been asked for, nothing has been done to give it practical effect

till three months ago, when the minister of marine submitted to the house of representatives extensive reform proposals. Since then the superior council of the navy has been engaged in framing an "organic law" for the re-constitution of the navy. It is understood that the council has fixed the strength of the new fleet at 45 battleships, 12 cruiser scouts, 60 squadron destroyers, 84 coast defence destroyers and 64 submarines, to be completed by 1925.

It is very significant of the altered European conditions and of the confidence felt in France that the entente cordiale with Britain will continue, that the present disposition of the French fleet and the contingencies taken into consideration in arranging the new program, no longer take the British fleet into account. France has viewed without apprehension the concentration of British naval strength in and about the North Sea, and by keeping her strongest battleships at Toulon has openly, if tacitly, shown her reliance on British friendship. On the other part Britain, by greatly reducing her Mediterranean squadron, has also avowed a similar assurance regarding the mutual understanding. The situation therefore in Europe is instructive as regards the imperial defence question. By dividing responsibility according to natural geographical advantages, each of several nations, acting in co-operation, not only serve the common purpose, but also strengthen each other at the points where danger is more immediately apprehended. To such a division of responsibility, permitting both of co-operation and the retention of individual state control, the empire easily lends itself, and it is in this way, as Lord Charles Beresford recently affirmed, that solution of the problem of imperial defence can alone be found.

Canada's Sacred Pledge.

(Extract from The News, Toronto.)

British statesmen are proverbially restrained in their public utterances regarding foreign relations, and Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, is a man of exceptional reserve, by no means given to overstatement or alarming announcements. Yet he has told the House of Commons that the British people cannot give up the naval competition, for, if they do, their liberty will be endangered, and they may become "the conscript appendage of some foreign Power." Never before, within the memory

of living man, has a British Foreign Secretary used such language. With the British Isles would fall the British Empire, and there would be an end of that amazing political organization which we are accustomed to regard as the most potent civilizing and Christianizing agency on earth. Mr. Balfour, the former premier, urges the Government to employ every agency and let every bit of machinery available in maintaining England's sea power. An English organ of public opinion has said that, "if we have not absolute mastery of the sea, the Empire will be shattered shard on shard."

And yet there are politicians at Ottawa who say that there is no crisis, and that the situation does not call for any special effort towards Canadian participation in the defence of the Empire. Sir Wilfred Laurier, from his place in Parliament, declares that nothing that has recently occurred can induce his Government to depart from its settled naval policy for the protection of our own coasts. As Mr. McNeill says, "this so-called 'settled policy' is purely theoretical. It was formulated seven years ago, and never has been put into operation. The author of such a moribund policy is in no position to sneer as he has done at New Zealand's gift of a Dreadnought as 'hasty, feverish and spectacular.'"

At the time of the German Emperor's telegram to President Kruger the Canadian Parliament adopted a resolution assuring the Mother Country that, should the occasion unfortunately arise in any other part of the Empire, the people of Canada would, by substantial sacrifices, attest the determination of the British race to maintain unimpaired the integrity and inviolate the honor of her Majesty's dominions. The House adopted this solemn pledge of fealty to a United Empire. The Mother Country, the other younger Britains and the world at large accepted the undertaking at its face value.

The time has come to redeem the pledge. Is it to be redeemed? Or are the other British peoples and all foreign nations to conclude that Canada's solemn declaration was mere heroics—all empty bounce and brag. As Mr. McNeill puts it, "are we, by our inaction, to appear to approve the conduct of our Prime Minister, when he sneered at the action of New Zealand, in spite of the glowing admiration for it expressed by our wise and peace-loving King? Are we, at such a time, to be compelled to stand idly by with folded arms and do nothing at all in contempt of our dearest desire, and in spite of our sacred pledge?"

The British Budget and the Empire at Stake.

(Toronto World, July 27.)

The recent imperial press conference, the widespread attention given to Wells' latest book, "Tono-Bungay" (a study of modern England from the social standpoint), the present struggle over the Lloyd-George budget, a strong sidelight on which was cast by the workmen's demonstration in London on Sunday, all suggest the great question for English-speaking peoples, the future of the empire.

According to Mr. Wells Mother England has about completed her cycle, and that cycle has ended largely in failure if we are to judge from the number of miserable lives lived by the majority of her people. The spread of intemperance, the lust for betting, the lack of decent existence for a large percentage of the people are things that few sober-minded men would care to perpetuate. Furthermore, when you know that the great bulk of the income of the nation goes into the hands of 250,000 of a selected class as against 45,000,000 of the masses, the surprise is only increased; and, when you find this same 250,000 rich, who get most of this money, clamoring for the building of more Dreadnoughts, while they resent the imposition on them by the new budget of what appears to be a just porportion of the cost of three Dreadnoughts, you must pause for a moment and ask where it is all leading to. And, still again, you might sometimes be inclined to ask if all the clamor in England against invasion, largely made by the classes, is not for the express purpose of saving existing social and economic conditions in England under the guise of saving the empire rather than an effort to save the people and to save the empire at the same time, which is certainly a commendable ambition and worthy of the best efforts of every patriot.

As far as one can gather the delegates to the imperial press conference got the view of clubland and of the 250,000 of the classes rather than the views of the people of England. As far as we read in the reports they did not see the people, they did not see the submerged masses, they did not hear their representative men even. They saw the England of the clubs, of high office and high finance, the England of the army and the navy, or rather those who control the army and the navy.

As to the financial struggle now on in England, whether the increased expenses of the country are to fall on the

rich or whether they are to come out of a tariff affecting all, we do not at the present moment attempt to say. We are satisfied at this stage to observe some of the landmarks. We believe, however, that England is worth saving; by that we mean the regeneration of the great bulk of the English people; but how to handle it is a problem of empire. We also believe that some kind of imperial co-operation must be arrived at for purposes of defence and for the maintenance of our common institutions; and we also believe that a tariff arrangement based upon preference would be a mighty means to that end.

We have not got all the facts yet and in the meantime a great many persons in the outer empire will watch with more than interest the struggle now on in England between the classes and the masses; the struggle to lift up the people by social reform rather than by warlike demonstration. The classes might save the empire, and they might save the people as a nation; but the likelihood is that the people will have to save themselves and save the empire as well. In the meantime it would not be wise to form an alliance between the classes of Great Britain and any dominating section of the oversea British democracies that might end only in saving a set of conditions which, to the minds of many, and especially the highest thinkers, have well-nigh reached their time for disappearing.

The first question in England to-day is the question of the budget, whether the comparatively few rich shall pay their fair share of the cost of financing the government in all its phases and manifestations. That struggle is now on, and the demonstration in London on Sunday would indicate that the people have made up their mind that the rich shall pay their full share. It does not, however, mean that the masses are not also prepared to pay their full share by means of the tariff if that tariff would improve conditions generally, would strengthen the empire, would still maintain Great Britain at the head of the twentieth century civilization.

To say that when England has shown she can save herself we can all turn in to save the empire would seem to sum up the situation to-day.

The British Budget and the Empire at Stake.

(Toronto World.)

Your spirited leader of the 27 inst., deals with one of the gravest ques-

tions of the day, and the observations expressed by Mr. Wells on Mother England are a timely warning, altho they savor of the alarmist's brand. When he states that it is only the 250,000 rich who clamor for the building of more Dreadnoughts, and that the bulk of the income of the nation goes into their hands, has he considered for one minute what the income of the British nation really is? The clamor for Dreadnoughts does not alone emanate from this class, the voice of the 45,000,000 of the masses is also heard. From an experience of seven years of daily contact with 5000 workers of these millions, the building of Dreadnoughts and similar war craft brings bread to the mouths of thousands who would otherwise be in a semi-state of starvation, during the dearth of a naval building program; which statement cannot be refuted by those having only a slight acquaintance with the ship-building centres of Great Britain. Whilst admitting that no naval building program will be the solution for the true and lasting amelioration of the suffering masses, it is better than no loaf at all in the districts alluded to, until the man arises who can solve this great issue of a country saving itself. England may well wake up to the solution of her internal needs, her past history has been the peace-maker of nations, and the time is opportune for her to be the peace-maker of her own social conditions. I am no believer of any autocratic doctrine, yet, at the same time, still believe that the nobler instincts of the rich of the twentieth century civilization will save England from herself, rising supreme to the great and pressing needs of the just and due considerations of her 45,000,000; which example will need emulating by younger nations of the empire, who allow slumdom to prevail in their fair cities without a tithe of the social evils contingent to an older country's congested millions.

Your leader is worthy of more than a casual reflection to those interested in such vital questions, which are just as worthy of deep consideration by every true thinking citizen as the true imperialist is in the question of an empire's defence.

T. W. Sheffield,

Oakville, July 28.

The Fleet of England, as the poet has justly observed, is her all in all. Therefore the readiness of the Fleet for war in every particular is a matter so important that it concerns every individual citizen. So soon as the in-

dividual citizen realizes his intimate concern with the Service the politicians will take care that the Navy is well provided—but not before. The Fleet has been assembled under the Commander-in-Chief for a week in the River Thames. How often during the last three years has it been assembled with the Commander-in-Chief for training purposes? During Lord Charles Beresford's two years' tenure of command in Home waters he was only once permitted to practise combined training. Upon one occasion his command was reduced by Admiralty order to seven battleships. After he had been ordered to haul down his flag the Home Fleet was sent into the North Sea with a large proportion of the battleships and cruisers half-manned. The recent manoeuvres lasted three days. Under the existing Admiralty regulations it is possible for any given ship to be nearly a year without doing any gunnery practice at all; and inquiry would reveal the fact that there are ships in that condition. These things, and others like them, are not the fault of the officers on active service. They are the fault of the Admiralty and of the Government. They are the result of ignorant administration on the one hand, and of parsimony on the other. Fleet training and gunnery practice are expensive; therefore they have been curtailed in every possible way. Battleships and cruisers and destroyers are very fine to see; but the point for the taxpayer to consider is: What are they allowed to do? It is in this essential regard that Parliament is sedulously kept in ignorance. If the politicians did their duty they would insist upon a detailed statement of the work done by the Fleet being presented to Parliament with the Navy Estimates. They would also insist on having the Navy Estimates presented in an intelligible form. They would demand, in fact, that the Admiralty should conduct its business in daylight, in order that the nation might both be able to judge if it is getting value for its money and become acquainted with the real requirements of the Service. Nor is there any reason why the Admiralty should not issue a weekly statement, showing what ships are with the Flag, what under repair, and what has been done during the week. Were such a return compiled of the last three or four years the result would be surprising in more ways than one.

(The News, Toronto, July 5, 1909.)
Naval Defence.

The statement made by Mr. George H. Bradbury, M. P., with regard to

feeling in the West upon the subject of naval defence is striking and significant. If we are to accept his estimate of public sentiment, the West has grasped the two features of the present situation:—1. The present German menace, which will come to a head about 1912, is so serious that Canada should bear a hand in the crisis. 2. Apart from the present crisis, it is necessary for Canada as quickly as possible to make herself a strength to, instead of a charge upon, the naval defence of the Empire, by establishing a naval force of her own.

Canada will not readily forget the utter lack of sympathy shown by the Laurier Government with the British nation in its present difficulty. The Premier's own attitude was grudging to a degree. The amendment which he moved to Mr. Foster's motion in its original form was devoted to telling Great Britain what Canada will not do. His reply to the invitation to the Naval Conference was a complete example of ineffective ungraciousness; while his offer, if real peril comes, to stump Quebec, must rank as a historic specimen of the anti-climax.

As for his followers—the spectacle of men who have never thought of the subject for five consecutive minutes coolly declaring Sir Edward Grey, Mr. McKenna and Mr. Balfour the ignorant victims of a panic, would be comical if it were not so ignoble an example of persistence in sponging. The occasion called for action like that taken by New Zealand and Australia—action that would show Germany that the Empire has many and incalculable centres of strength. It produced, not a Dreadnought, but talk.

As regards the second aspect of the problem, the only way is for Canada to develop a navy of her own. Men are more important than machinery. One type of ship after another may be invented and may be superseded; one kind of weapon after another may appear and disappear; but men, bold, skilful, disciplined, and patriotic, always must be the real defence and strength of a nation. Canada must have a force of her own naval seamen, to defend her and to defend the Empire; and they must have the ships which from time to time are necessary. That is why our permanent contribution to the naval strength of the Empire must be an indigenous Canadian navy.

Mr. Foster put this point admirably in his speech on the subject in the House of Commons last March. "Suppose," he said, in dealing with the specious argument that the most effective way of helping would be to

send an annual recurring contribution to the Admiralty, "suppose you contribute this year your sum, and next year your equal sum, and thereafter year after year. After ten or twelve, or twenty, or thirty years, you will have paid out an immense amount of money. You will have been protected in the meantime; but in Canada itself there will be no roots struck, there will be no residue left, there will be no preparation of the soil, or beginning of the growth of the product of defence. Yet some time or another, no one can doubt that with resources and a population constantly increasing, we must and will have in this country a naval force of our own for our coast and home defence. The interest that we take in a contribution spent by another is not the interest that I desire for Canada. I want to see something grafted on the soil of Canada's manhood, which takes root and grows and develops until it incites the spirit of defence in this country, leads to a participation in the defence, leads to that quick interest in it, its glories, its duties and its accomplished work, which is after all the one great thing that compensates a people for great expenditures, either on land or sea, in the way of defence and of the maintenance of the rights of the country."

Naval Defence.

(Col. G. T. Denison.)

Toronto, May 6th, 1909.

While approving of the resolution passed by the Dominion Parliament with regard to Imperial naval defence, the British Empire League in Canada at its annual meeting last evening in St. George's Hall, urged that the Government should take steps speedily to give effect to it. A resolution was also passed expressing appreciation of the action of New Zealand. Col. G. T. Denison in his Presidential address dealt at some length with the naval situation. He deprecated the policy of the establishment of a Canadian fleet of small vessels, holding that the war of the future for the supremacy of the seas would be between battleships of large size. He urged, therefore, that Canada should at least contribute a Dreadnought to the Imperial navy.

Premier Whitney moved the following resolution: "That the British Empire League of Canada wishes to express its gratification that the Canadian Parliament has unanimously declared it to be the duty of Canada to assist the empire in naval defence, and hopes that steps will speedily be taken to give effect to such declara-

tion." The resolution, which was seconded by Mr. Alex. McNeill, ex-M. P., and supported by Mr. W. K. George, was carried unanimously.

The main portion of Col. G. T. Denison's Presidential address dealt with the relations of Great Britain and Germany, and the question of naval defence.

Germany is preparing for this great struggle without any concealment. It is not only the ambition of the Emperor that is the cause of this. The idea has seized the imagination of the people, who have formed navy leagues of enormous numbers everywhere, and who are clamorous for an overpowering fleet. The rapid growth of her navy is marvellous. About three years ago she had only two slips on which Dreadnoughts could be built; now she has seventeen, and within the three years the Krupps have increased their works enormously and have added 38,000 men to their staff of employees. While this has been going on in Germany, thousands of skilled workmen from our English dockyards and arsenals have been turned adrift to seek employment elsewhere, and probably among our enemies. Another ominous fact is the statement that Austria is about to build eight Dreadnoughts.

Goneril or Cordelia?

There seems to be more than mere idle talk in the two views expressed by leading Canadian papers during the past week or ten days with respect to the duty of the Dominion in making some kind of tangible contribution toward the Imperial navy.

The one opinion was, and is, that this colony owes a debt of gratitude to Britain, which should be immediately paid by the gift of a powerful Dreadnought or a substantial contribution, the time being ripe as a result of Germany's aggressive attitude. The other is that much of the present excitement has been caused in England by a melodrama which represents the British Isles being invaded by a foreign foe, and this excitement has been increased and extended through the efforts of a sensation-loving press.

That there should be considerable distance between the two classes of people holding these views does not remove Canada's obligation or alter her position with relation to the Motherland. Granting that the whole subject has been nurtured and ripened by a play, by newspapers, by unbridled speakers, does not this country still remain a debtor to Britain beyond what one battleship could pay? That there is any likelihood whatever

of Germany, or any other power, disputing Britain's sovereignty of the seas, in the near future, appears purely imaginary. No complications have arisen of sufficient magnitude to incite either nation to hostility, nor is there any evidence that such conditions are probable within many years. But considering Canada as a daughter of Great Britain would not the former be displaying true filial respect and loyalty by contributing in some measure to the continuance of Britain's naval supremacy?

It ill becomes the daughter of any household, who has grown attractive and frugal under her parents' protection and counsel, to offer no little token of gratitude until the lives of those parents are endangered! We can easily conceive of such a person, but do not our minds instinctively turn to the domestic life of King Lear? Do we not at once place such a daughter in the same category as Goneril—a woman whose selfishness made her traitor to a tender father?

A nation is but a collection of homes and individuals.

While we as Canadians are under a British monarch his Parliament is mother of our own, imperial benefactions are meted out to us in the form of national protection, of financial loans, totaling, it is estimated, \$200,000,000 last year, great markets for the products of our farms, of immunity from political and religious oppression.

We receive these things with thanks and on public occasions make much ado over our vaunted loyalty to the British crown. What is our actual feeling, what our sincerity when there are no toasts being offered? Are we Coneril or are we Cordelia?

Canada should not regard the gift of a battleship as a debt that must be paid for fear the interest accrue and make the burden too heavy to bear. If that is the spirit of the offering it were a sacrifice better left off the altar. Rather, this country should look upon her position as one which impels her to some act of gratitude for the benefits and advantages received.

When a view such as this inspires our speeches on public platforms, at banquets on national holidays, we will contribute to Britain's navy, not because the motherland is in peril, but because we desire to respect and honor the hand that fed us in our infancy, the arm that guided us in our young nationhood, the wisdom that silently directs us in our parliaments.—J. M. Elson, in Sunday World, March 28, 1909.

Extract from Lord Charles Beresford's speech:

Empire Day, 1909, is associated with what is one of the greatest national issues since the colonies became self-governing states. "The time has arrived in the history of our great empire," said Lord Charles Beresford, addressing an Australasian audience on Friday last, "for us to look very carefully and very narrowly into the question of Imperial defence as a whole." The veteran sailor spoke to all the nations of the empire. He affirmed that because foreign countries were steadily increasing their navies the old system of imperial defence could no longer suffice. "The question of Imperial defence," said the admiral, "is certainly in the minds of the Dominions, because they have come forward to try to show us over here that we are getting a bit sleepy; that we are not taking things as they are; that we are not looking facts in the face. * * * The lead has been shown us by the Dominions." The position, in essentials, is clear. Under existing arrangements Great Britain charged herself with the task of controlling the ocean ways which are the communications of the King's dominions, while the over-sea states devoted their income to the development of their resources. The necessity of maintaining supreme control over communications is the central fact of the British empire. That control can only be challenged at sea; therefore the measure of the force required is the strength of the potential adversary. For many years France was the chief potential adversary. Upon one occasion she tried to out-build us. She failed, and gave up the attempt. Russia, a few years later, lost her navy by defeat. In the meantime arose the naval powers of Germany, of the United States, and of Japan. During the last two years the Peace Conference at The Hague has revived privateering, which was abolished by the Declaration of Paris in 1856. And by the Declaration of London of 1909 (not yet ratified) foodstuffs are scheduled as contraband of war. "If things go on as they are progressing," said Lord Charles Beresford, "in the near future it will be absolutely impossible for this country to maintain what is called the two-power standard—it will mean a question of bankruptcy or defeat."

That is the position. The over-sea nations, with admirable tact, have manifested their desire to take part in the control of communications, so

that there has been no need for England to raise the question. Indeed, she could not have raised it until another question was settled—the question of representation in the Imperial Executive Council. The secession of the thirteen colonies settled the principle of contribution for ever. And although New Zealand was ready to waive the point for the time being, Great Britain could not have accepted the younger Dominion's generous offer on those terms. Australia had already determined to avoid the difficulty by building her own squadron for coast defence, and Canadian sentiment was tending to the same conclusion. The home authorities remained silent. Lord Charles Beresford is probably the only man in the empire who could have stepped forward and shown the way. At any rate, he is the only man who has done it. He speaks with the authority of fifty years of brilliant service, and with all the force of one who wants nothing for himself. His proposition is that the four nations should each build a squadron of cruisers for the protection of communications, while the fifth should maintain the battle fleets as heretofore. There will be time enough to discuss the question of representation while the fleets are building. The deliberations of the naval conference which is shortly to assemble in London will proceed upon the principle that there can be no contribution without representation. For the rest, the one important thing is to build the ships. No technical knowledge is required in order to appreciate the danger of armed merchantmen privateers let loose on the trade routes, together with swift cruisers. But if, as Lord Charles Beresford said, the "Five Nations meet together to think out the question we shall be able to keep the two-power standard; and if we do that we can smoke our cigars and smile, whatever the rest of the world may do."

Extract from the Mail and Empire, July 8, 1909:

HOW SHALL WE AID THE NAVY?

Angry disputations on the subject of participation in naval defence are altogether irrelevant and useless. What is needed is not a quarrel upon the question, but a calm discussion and a determination to reach a sane conclusion. Two things have been made clear by the debate, so far as it has gone. One is the fact that the leaders of thought in Great Britain are of the opinion that the over-sea portions of the empire, which have

long enjoyed naval defence without contributing to its cost, are entitled now to assume a share of the burden. The other is the circumstance that in Canada there is a very general belief that something ought to be done.

Among Canadians who favor action a difference of opinion prevails, however, touching the particular shape such action should take. On the one hand, we have those who think that we ought to contribute money to the admiralty, or that we should present ships. On the other, we have a body of thought which stands for a local navy, built by ourselves, and directed independently of the Admiralty, with the defence of our own coasts in view. Some of the advocates of a money contribution, or of a Dreadnought gift, maintain that a local navy would not be useful, in that it would be too far removed from the Imperial force. Moreover, if built by ourselves, as some claim it should be, it would be wanting in efficiency, owing to our unfamiliarity with the difficult art of naval construction. Again, if designed especially for coast service, it would not serve for Imperial defence, which, in case of hostilities, is the first thing to be considered. These are important points, and cannot be lightly brushed aside. The friends of the other view urge upon us the argument that we ought to give no money to the Imperial navy because such a policy would interfere with our autonomy, and would be of the nature of tribute. Further, we must build and sail whatever ships we determine upon, and must employ such vessels in coast defence, and not in any other service. The divergent opinions are very positive. It is not wise, it is not just, to treat either of them as unworthy of discussion. Rather should we examine them both, with a view to finding common ground, if that be possible. Unfortunately, when we look across the ocean hoping to get help that is necessary to a solution of the difficulty, we are not aided as we should be. In that quarter official opinions are as yet divided. There we learn that a separate navy, under local administration, is all that is needed. There, too, we are informed that such a navy would not be serviceable were the supremacy of the empire upon the sea challenged. We are, therefore, deprived of the guidance in this matter for which we may reasonably look.

But it is surely not impossible to reach a policy that may be agreeable to both sides of thought. We might, for example, have our own naval ves-

sels, built with our money, and manned by our men, on service in our own waters in times of peace, but subject to call to the point at which the decisive battle will be fought should war be declared. Here we save our autonomy and escape tribute, while making a valuable contribution to the defence of the empire. It would be well if the naval experts, instead of being decisive on the question, would unite upon a scheme for submission to the conference soon to be held.

Extract from the News.

A MARITIME NATION.

If Canada were a land-locked country in the heart of a continent like Switzerland or Thibet we should have no naval responsibilities. But the fact is that, from a geographical standpoint, few nations are more maritime than the Dominion. It is bounded on three sides by three oceans, and for two-thirds of the fourth side by five inland seas and a mighty river. Our sea coast is far and away the longest of any country in the world. Halifax, St. John, Sydney and Quebec look out across the Atlantic, which to-day is the chief highway of the country's commerce. Vancouver, Victoria and Prince Rupert front the Pacific, which to-morrow will supplant the Atlantic as the scene of the greatest commercial activity.

By way of the St. Lawrence ocean-going vessels pierce 1,000 and even 2,000 miles into the heart of the continent. Only six or seven other nations boast a greater aggregate shipping tonnage. Our mercantile marine traverse every sea, and trades to most of the world's chief ports. Our foreign commerce approximates to the \$700,000,000 mark. Our fisheries are extensive and profitable. The coast industries of British Columbia and the Atlantic provinces support a large seafaring population.

It is undeniable that Canadians are primarily a maritime people. We are also a rich people. And yet Parliament acts as if we were some insignificant inland race, isolated from the rest of the world, poor in pocket and in spirit. The House of Commons, as at present constituted, does not worthily represent the great daughter of the sea-girt isles. The blood of the Vikings and the Normans is ours. We are sprung from two proud European peoples. The leader of the government fails to voice or interpret the real sentiments of the nation.

The duty of the Dominion is plain and straight before its people. We

cannot longer refuse to contribute anything towards the defence of our own extended coast-line. It is beneath our dignity that the Mother Country should continue to convey our merchant fleets, and furnish them with coaling stations on every continent—wholly at her own expense. Nor can we let a sister state go on paying our way in the world. New Zealand gives a Dreadnought. Australia builds twenty-one war vessels. The Canadian Parliament passes a resolution, and it is feared that the two Federal Ministers who will go to England to consult with the Admiralty will deal with a very pressing and insistent problem in a wholly perfunctory and inadequate manner. It is essential that self-respecting electors all over the country should continue to bring pressure to bear upon their representatives at Ottawa to the end that the Government may be made to recognize and to rise to the requirements of the situation, and that the nation may be spared further humiliation before the eyes of the other British peoples and the on-looking world.

NAVAL DEFENCE.

(The Toronto Globe, July 15.)

The Ottawa Journal makes a plea for an unpartisan discussion of the question of naval defence, and then manifests its allegiance to its own plea by declaring that "the Liberal press in Canada, almost to a newspaper, assumes an owlish guise of grandfatherly tolerance for the misguided apostles of self-respect, talks soundingly of Canadian autonomy or sneeringly of Unionist machinations." A somewhat careful scrutiny of the columns of Canadian newspapers indicates that there is a considerable diversity of opinion on both sides of the political fence as to what should be done. A few of the Conservative newspapers of the baser sort have, of course, no views in particular, their vision of everything being colored by the ever-present question, How can the Government be embarrassed? The opportunity of suggesting that Sir Wilfrid Laurier's attitude toward the matter is regulated by his lack of "loyalty," although his position is identical with that of Mr. Borden, whose "loyalty" no Tory newspaper would think of questioning, cannot be lost. The Halifax Herald, in its broad-minded and urbane way, sums up its view of the Premier by declaring that "he has done more to set race against race, creed against creed, and Canada against Great Britain,

than any other one man living or dead." There should be a Pasteur institute for the treatment of political rabies of this kind.—The Globe, July 15th.

It is fair to say, however, that a number of the Conservative newspapers have followed the lead of Parliament in treating the question rationally and impartially, and while there are wide differences of opinion as to details, there is a pretty general agreement on all sides that the time has come when Canada should do something substantial in assuming a portion of the burden of naval defence. Events show that other powers are disposed to dispute Great Britain's mastery of the sea. Germany, for example, was credited with putting the matter in the form of a simple proposition that 65,000,000 people can afford to build more ships than 40,000,000. If any such notion is abroad, the moment has arrived when such calculators should be apprised of the fact that there are other factors which will have to be taken into account. It may be confessed that financially the time was not an opportune one for Canada. The Dominion has assumed enormous burdens for the development and settlement of the country. We are just at the stage when it is all expenditure and little returns. But if the prompt appearance of Great Britain's colonies in the naval field has the tendency to convince all the nations that a contest of this kind would be hopeless, and that the empire must win whatever the cost, an enormous service would be rendered the motherland—a service which the colonies are gratefully prepared to pay.

If the news flashed over the wires to-morrow that the integrity of British soil had been compromised by the invasion of 100,000 men, what would be the effect in every part of the empire? Their whole energies would be withdrawn from every other species of national activity and thrown into the effort to protect and redeem the soil which is as sacred as our own. Every sacrifice would be assumed; expenditure would not be considered; the man who hinted at neglecting any exertion or proposal because of the cost of it would be shoved aside with contempt. We are in the midst of no such crisis, but we are in the midst of a conjunction of affairs of serious import to the British islands—the power house of the empire. It may be that Germany would not attack Great Britain, even though in the next few years the fleets of the two countries were of a parity. But could the

British accept even the most solemn engagements in that regard? It would be madness to do so. The assurance of unimpeded ocean highways is as necessary to the British Isles as breath is to the human body. Rather than see her position in that way imperilled, it can be said with confidence on behalf of the Canadian people that no sacrifice on their part would be too great. Parliament did a wise thing in suggesting consultation with the home authorities, and we feel sure that our delegates are proceeding to the conference with a perfect willingness to be largely directed by the expert knowledge of those familiar with the whole situation as to how Canada can best serve the common interests in making her entrance in the field of naval action. We believe that our delegates should be firm on the policy that whatever is done shall lead to the formation of the nucleus of a Canadian navy. That must come sooner or later, and it may as well come now as later. It may look slow, but in the end it will be swifter and best.

NAVAL INQUIRY.

Lord Charles Beresford and the Admiralty Question—His Suggestions Acted Upon—Not Disloyal to the Board.

Admiral Lord Charles Beresford has addressed the following letter to the press:

To the Editor: Sir—The report of the committee appointed by the Prime Minister to investigate the statements made in my letter of the 2nd April, 1909, is in the main a great satisfaction to me. Some of the reforms which, in my belief, are essential for our naval organization have now been accepted, and are part of the present admiralty program. My position as an officer lately exercising high command, and anxious as to the naval situation, was one of extreme difficulty. It was my bounden duty to represent to the Prime Minister in the first instance the dangers that were apparent to me. The sub-committee formed by the Prime Minister from members of his own cabinet was virtually called upon to investigate a policy for which the cabinet is responsible. Unless they had committed themselves to the complete reorganization of the Admiralty, it would hardly be possible for them to have produced a report more in accordance with my statements. My action during the past two years in respectfully submitting certain suggestions to the

Admiralty, and my letter to the Prime Minister after dismissal, have been followed by these satisfactory results:

1. A large homogeneous fleet has been formed.

2. It is stated that this fleet will be placed under a single supreme control.

3. There is to be combined training of units with their respective divisions.

4. Some combined training of fleets took place during the recent manoeuvres.

5. It is believed that the effective strength at sea will be maintained by the substitution of those vessels away for purposes of refit or of repair by others.

6. The "nucleus crew" ships are now regarded as a reserve.

7. A naval strategical bureau, or war staff at the Admiralty, to the necessity of which frequent attention has been called, is stated to be in progress of formation.

8. A complete change has taken place in the organization and distribution of the fleet on the lines suggested.

The manner of bringing about these reforms is immaterial, provided that the reforms are accomplished. It cannot have been the intention of the committee to imply that in any of my actions or communications with the Board during my tenure of command I was guilty of disloyalty to the spirit of the instructions of the Board, or that I ever failed to recognize their paramount authority, but the following paragraph in the report, considered apart from its context, might give rise to such an inference:

"And Lord Charles Beresford, on the other hand, appears to have failed to appreciate and carry out the spirit of the instructions of the Board and to recognize their paramount authority."

In the whole of the official communication which it was my duty to make to the constituted authority there was not one word which could be construed into disrespect, disloyalty and indiscipline or which in the remotest degree reflected upon the paramount authority of the Admiralty. The report itself says that "the Board of Admiralty did not take Lord

Charles Beresford into its confidence." Under such conditions how was it possible for me to define what was in their lordships' minds and what their wishes were.

Upon the Admiralty, and the Admiralty alone, must devolve all responsibility for strategic plans, allocation of fleets, and numbers of vessels employed. The authority of the Admiralty must be paramount. But it is the duty of the commander-in-chief, if he thinks plans, allocations, and numbers of ships are inefficient or are insufficient to enable him to carry out the orders he may receive from the Admiralty, to make respectful representations to that effect. "Every commander-in-chief who undertakes to execute a plan which he thinks bad or injurious, is criminal. He ought to make representations, to insist upon a change, finally to resign rather than be the instrument of the ruin of his own people." Such was Napoleon's view of the matter, and I was content to take it for my own guidance.

On these lines I have done my duty. The committee expressly dissociate themselves from giving any opinion with regard to the grave deficiency of medium cruisers and destroyers, beyond stating they believe no danger to the country is involved in that deficiency. Upon this point I cannot but maintain my conviction that there is a present and a serious danger. It is conclusively shown by the final paragraph of the report of the sub-committee, that the holding of this inquiry has been of immense educational advantage to the members of the committee, and therefore to the cabinet.

The finding that there was no danger "in fact" cannot be much attributed to the excellence of the existing organization as to the good fortune of the country in not having been attacked during the period described by the committee as that of a "transitory and provisional character." I have the honor to be, sir,—Your obedient servant,

CHARLES BERESFORD, Admiral.

1 Great Cumberland Place, W.

August 16th, 1909.

GOD SAVE THE KING.



